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1 This work is greatly indebted to the research on the evolution of law and litigation practices pertaining to bankruptcy before 
the World War that I am currently conducting with Pierre-Cyrille Hautcoeur (Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales 
et Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques, UMR CNRS-EHESS-ENPC-ENS) and to various discussions with the members of 
the ACI “Histoire du contentieux” directed by Alessandro Stanziani (IDHE, ENS Cachan, CNRS). I also wish to thank 
Evelyne Serverin (IRERP, Université de Paris 10 Nanterre, CNRS) and Thierry Kirat (IRISES, Université Paris Dauphine, 
CNRS) for the time they devoted to me and their generous advice and suggestions. In keeping with custom, none of them are 
not responsible for any errors or omission in this text. 
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 Abstract : 
The evolutions of the bankruptcy law seek to reach many aims: economic safety, 
firms’ creation and expansion in a capitalist economy, protection of the interests 
of the agents involved in transactions that goes far beyond creditors and debtors, 
and prolongation of the activity of viable firms. This contribution examines the 
French insolvency law and its transformations since the 19th century from a 
historical and concrete point of view which makes it possible to put in 
perspective the modifications and the uses of the legal rules in an economic and 
institutional context. The underlying assumptions and the main results contradict 
the conclusions of the Law and Economics theory which insist on the weak 
economic efficiency and the low ability to protect creditors’ interest of the 
bankruptcy law. We show that far from being only one means of selection 
thanks to which the market could be cleared of its failing agents, the bankruptcy 
law opens a non commercial space of resolution of the failures of market which, 
by releasing the actors of their former constraints, authorizes them to reinstate 
the business world. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction: bankruptcy, between an economic state and a legal 
construction 
Company default is an inseparable component of any market economy in 
which the survival of producers is conditioned in the short term by liquidity and 
in the long term by their solvency. Failure to comply with the latter condition, 
defined in accounting terms as insufficient available assets to meet current 
liabilities, endangers the company and may be grounds for proceedings that 
could lead to liquidation of the business. These financial considerations suggest 
a clear-cut separation, either based on accounts or virtually naturally, between 
healthy and failing companies. The origins of bankruptcy law show that this is 
not the case and while the nature of the default is obviously economic, it is also, 
and to the same extent, legal. The source of this twofold connection lies in the 
definition of bankruptcy, which means a trader is unable to honour his 
payments. As Bravard-Veyrières (1840) emphasised, this definition presupposes 
that two conditions are met, for “to be in default, it is necessary to have stopped 
his payments and to have stopped them as a trader” (Bravard-Veyrières 1840, p. 
497). Thus, this twofold condition will underlie our discussion of the evolution 
of the law and litigation practices pertaining to bankruptcy, which today is 
largely dominated by viewing the law in terms of economic efficiency. 
The idea that the law evolves with a view to attaining a greater degree of 
efficiency is directly inherited from work by scholars focused on the economic 
efficiency of law and economics and the comparative analysis of legal systems, 
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led by the emblematic figures of La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, Shleifer and 
Vishny, abbreviated below as LLSV (La Porta et al., 1998), who have produced 
numerous disciples in the field of business financing (Glaeser and Shleifer, 
2002) and bankruptcy (Djankov et al., 2006). In general, these works help to 
show the superiority of bankruptcy law based on the common law tradition over 
the legal system of cessation of payment developed in countries with a civil or 
Roman legal code. The final proof of good performance in bankruptcy treatment 
by common law is presented under the heading “Closing a business” in the 
annual World Bank survey on “Doing business”. Referring to the English law on 
bankruptcies in 1732 as the source of modern bankruptcy law, the authors of the 
2004 report view the greater experience authorised by this seniority as the cause 
of the efficiency of the legal systems that flow from it. Indeed, they have come 
farther on the path towards efficiency and, for that reason, among others, are 
said to come closer than the other legal systems to achieving the three “universal 
goals of bankruptcy” (Doing business in 2004, p. 72): the maximisation of the 
value of liquidated assets through a swift liquidation operation, the rescue of 
viable businesses and compliance with the rank of creditors. The annual ranking, 
an extract of which is shown below, drawn up on the basis of three indicators of 
legal efficiency – the duration of the liquidation proceedings, the cost of the 
bankruptcy as a percentage of assets and the rate of recovery – shows excellent 
performance in Canada, the Scandinavian countries, Japan, and to a lesser 
extent, the United Kingdom, considered as common law countries, compared 
with the very mediocre position of France, an archetype of the civil legal 
system. 
Here we find the clearest manifestation of the economic view of bankruptcy 
law designed as an instrument to achieve the best possible result (Cabrillo and 
Depoorter, 1999, p. 261). 
Chart no. 1 – Extract of the ranking of bankruptcy proceeding efficiency 
 Length of the procedure  
(in years) 
Cost  
(% of assets) 
Recovery rate  
(in %) 
Australia 1.0 8.0 79.7 
Canada 0.8 3.5 89.3 
Denmark 3.0 4.0 70.5 
Finland 0.9 3.5 89.1 
France 1.9 9.0 48.0 
Japan 0.6 3.5 92.7 
Norway 0.9 1.0 91.1 
Sweden 2.0 9.0 75.7 
United Kingdom 1.0 6.0 85.2 
United States 1.5 7.0 77.0 
(Source: “Closing a business”, Doing Business, www.doingbusiness.org) 
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In the place of this normative view of the law, in keeping with the 
distinction made by Kirat (2003), we will substitute a view of the movement of 
law within a dynamic historical framework combining autonomy and 
heteronomy that underlies the pragmatist analysis of law in action. Far from 
being based on an antagonistic conception of the conflict, which should be 
avoided or minimised at the time, here the proceedings become a possible forms 
of coordination. As the purpose of the law in this case is no longer to eliminate 
conflict, it can on the contrary function as a genuine mechanism for social 
regulation by the way it distances the parties. Instead of seeing the development 
of bankruptcy law as the result of a search for every better means of increasing 
the efficiency of commercial relations, we are looking at bankruptcy as an 
institution through the human and social actions related to the law (Lascoumes 
and Serverin, 1988). In so doing, we move away from the linear schema 
according to which the emergence of new institutions results from tendencies 
outside the individuals that take part in this construction and adopt instead the 
institutionalist viewpoint, notably due to Commons (1924), for whom the 
enforcement of a rule, like its construction, contributes to producing the law. 
The legal proceedings determined by the strategies of the economic actors that 
initiate them thus contribute in fact to achieving an effect that complies with the 
one expected by lawmakers.
2
  
Two elements, already present in the founding documents of bankruptcy law 
which are the thirteen articles under title XI relating to default and bankruptcy in 
Colbert’s order of March 1673, reproduced in large part in Book III of the 
Commercial Code of 1807, will guide us in developing this point of view: 
firstly, how the judge qualifies the state of bankruptcy and secondly, the 
determination, by law, of trader status. These two pillars enter jointly into 
delimiting the scope of application of the rules governing bankruptcy and 
thereby influence the quantitative size of the legal proceedings initiated by the 
report of cessation of payment. This initial relationship between the scope of 
application of the law and the activity of the courts will constitute the first point 
in support of our analysis. It will be supplemented by questioning the meaning 
of the relationship as a dynamic factor in the law, which constitutes the second 
focal point of our work. These two foundations have been presented in earlier 
work (Hautcoeur and Levratto, 2006). This twofold framework leads us to a 
critique of the opposition between pro-debtor and pro-creditor bankruptcy law as 
a guide to assessing efficiency in this area, which the Law and Economics 
approach has done based on the analytic grid it has developed and the 
assessment method it uses. Then we will propose a new reading of the evolution 
of bankruptcy law as a capitalist institution, which will give us a grid for a new 
                                                 
2
 We would recall that for Commons, economics is “a practical science of the coordination of individual and collective actions based on 
rules, which integrates conflicts of interest and power relationships between social groups, for the rules are largely produced within the scope 
of settling disputes” (Bazzoli and Kirat, 2003). 
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interpretation of the evolution of the law and practices relating to cessation of 
payments. We will rely on two phenomena for this purpose: the extension of the 
scope of application, on the one hand, and the opposition between a bankruptcy 
law that organises an optimum mode of sharing company assets and the law 
governing companies in financial distress aimed at correcting earlier market 
mistakes such as granting excessive loans, on the other. 
2. Spatial and historical breaks: questionable keys for interpretation in Law 
and Economics 
The renown of the economic approach to law maintained by LLSV rests on an 
analysis of the evolution of the law and rules governing bankruptcy that relies 
on a methodology characterised by considerable recourse to econometrics to 
substantiate the framework for interpretation constructed by the authors 
connected with it. This framework is rooted in a preconception that can be 
assimilated to a Coasian bargaining situation
3
. Situations are compared to a sort 
of ideal benchmark that defines a normative standard, prompting Djankov et al. 
to say that “in a theoretical model of an ideal court, a conflict between two 
neighbours can be settled equitably by a third party, with a little bit of 
knowledge or a limited use of the law, without lawyers or written proceedings, 
without procedural constraints regarding the manner of investigation, testimony, 
the way of presenting arguments, and without appeals” (Djankov, et al., 2003, 
p. 455). When a “good” law is defined as the one that does not exist, a series of 
often quantitative arguments will be mobilised to demonstrate the superiority of 
interpersonal relationships over legal proceedings and of common law over civil 
law. By focusing our approach on the treatment of companies in financial 
distress, we are seeking here to deconstruct the method and its presuppositions 
(paragraph 2.1.) before giving an account of the fragility of the identified 
divisions (paragraph 2.2.). 
2.1. Theoretical a priori and methodological bias 
When applied to bankruptcy, the approach adopted in Law and Economics, 
which is essentially positive, presupposes that reforms of the legal system are 
necessary because the procedures in force are not efficiency in most countries. 
This results in limited use of the rules in place for fear of seeing either the asset 
value diminish to such an extent that the creditors will only recover a small part 
of their due, or an exclusion from business life that prompts the entrepreneur to 
dissimulate his problems. On the contrary, when bankruptcy law is “good”, 
companies in financial distress and their suppliers do not hesitate to have 
recourse to proceedings from which they expect quick, efficient results. In 
addition to these direct advantages, the business climate is said to improve as a 
                                                 
3
 Here we find implicitly imposed Locke’s idea according to which contractual freedom is a natural human right, an 
institution of natural law which exists independently of the consent or sanction of society and therefore of the legal system. 
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result of the tidying up of bankruptcy law. Two dimensions of the application of 
the LLSV approach are examined in depth here: the systematic and exclusive 
minimisation of transaction costs (2.1.1.), and knowledge of the law in the books 
to the detriment of the actual practice of the actors and the methodology 
underlying the construction of performance indicators (2.1.2.) 
2.1.1. A quest for the Grail: the minimisation of transaction costs 
The inclusion of bankruptcy law in an economic perspective centred on the 
distribution of assets is characteristic of the penetration of the law by the 
political economy objectives characteristic of the recent period. By including 
procedures relating to cessation of payment in the policy agenda to stimulate 
growth based on the production of wealth by companies, legislators in most 
OECD countries gave up a moral and social vision of bankruptcy law to bring it 
within a private framework guaranteeing company prosperity or turnaround, or 
in the worst scenario, a quick liquidation of the business in such a way as to 
favour the reuse of production plant in another framework. The utilitarian 
approach that prevails here is especially obvious in “Doing Business” which 
argues in favour of a “modernisation of the law” based exclusively on practical 
considerations. Thus, one of the two French partners in the survey maintains that 
the law must be tidied up due to the globalisation of trade, that “the relative 
efficiency of the law is obviously a factor in economic productivity and [that] in 
this area, France must do better by pragmatically agreeing to search for greater 
efficiency...” (Backer, 2006, p. 2). 
Two questions flow from the positive vision of bankruptcy law, which are 
related to the efficiency of the procedures within the scope of a market economy 
that orients the content of the research carried out. An initial level of analyses 
asks what means are available to collective proceedings to distribute the risks 
among all the actors in a market economy in a predictable, equitable and 
transparent way. In addition to this previous question, the work seeks to identify 
what incentive mechanisms collective proceedings have acquired to encourage 
market economy actors to make sound decisions. Contributing to solving these 
questions guarantees the introduction of efficient law, i.e. bankruptcy law in 
which the procedures fulfil a twofold function: 
- They give rise to good incentives for debtors and creditors in such a 
way as to encourage entrepreneurial 
- They ensure good selection of companies by eliminating from the 
market those that are performing poorly and rescuing the others. 
Seen in this light, bankruptcy law is essentially designed to help businesses 
continue and protect the value of the company in the interest of all the 
stakeholders. To reach this objective, collective proceedings must be 
implemented which avoid dangerous competition among creditors and enable 
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viable businesses with temporary problems to be filtered out from those with a 
structurally compromised future. According to LLSV, this aim would be 
achieved through English common law, which favours private arrangements 
among debtors and creditors. French law, on the other hand, is held to be 
inefficient because it is too costly, with low rates of recovery of the amounts due 
to creditors and too favourable to the debtor (Davidenko and Franks, 2005). The 
changes to be brought to procedures for handling cessations of payment thus 
depend on the level of the country’s score and rank in the World Bank 
classification. In general, they must contribute to improving the level of at least 
one of the criteria presented above (the length of time required to process a 
bankruptcy case, the cost of the bankruptcy itself and the rate of claim 
recovery). Two types of efficiency will then be attained: 
- ex ante efficiency consisting in encouraging the actors in a market 
economy (mainly company directors and shareholders, as well as banks in 
their decision to grant credit) to make the right decisions in order to avoid 
situations resulting in shortfalls of short-term liquidity and medium- or 
long-term insolvency. Here again the means available to collective 
proceedings must be balanced so as not to appear too disadvantageous and 
discourage the risk-taking inherent in entrepreneurship and the smooth 
workings of the market economy.  
- ex post efficiency consists in liquidating only non-viable companies and 
maximising, or at least protecting, the value of the company in the interest 
of all the stakeholders and the economy in general. This first principle 
explains the intrinsically collective nature of this type of procedure: 
individual actions by creditors to recover their claims would result in 
piecemeal sale of the company that would prevent it from obtaining the 
best price for the disposal of its assets. The number of stakeholders 
(creditors with absolute priority, secured or unsecured creditors, 
shareholders, administrations and social organisations, potential buyers, 
society, etc.) generates a variety of often conflicting interests. 
Behind these two types of efficiency, we find the utilitarian conception of 
bankruptcy law as the guarantor of the smooth operation of the economy insofar 
as it prevent creditors holding securities from collectively initiating a downward 
spiral of foreclosures and bank defaults that could cause a worldwide crisis like 
the one in 1933 (Bufford, 1994). The positive vision of law adopted here is also 
the source of the univocal association of procedural complexity with legal 
complexity, captured by the indicator that measures the time required to apply 
the measures provided for first in the commercial code and secondly in company 
bankruptcy law. As a result, the analysis leaves aside the social norms and 
extralegal factors that should be taken into account in any analysis of 
comparative law (Siems, 2005), especially as “a specific function may be 
assumed by a legal rule in one country and by an extralegal phenomenon in 
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another country” (Ibid, p. 529). The question that arises is thus the method to 
adopt and the sources to use in order to take into account the interdependence 
between institutions or laws, i.e. to carry out an endogenous assessment of 
national systems of economic rules and regulations. How can we get beyond a 
self-centred analysis of bankruptcy law and establish links between company 
law, credit law and insolvency the law to escape the univocal positivism 
characteristic of Law and Economics and enrich it with a more diverse view of 
capitalism? 
2.1.2. An essentially textual knowledge at the origin of biased indices 
This reading of bankruptcy law in terms of efficiency relies on a certain 
reading of the individual laws making it up. The paradigm established around 
LLSV gives rise to a sort of paradox because, on the one hand, they are writing 
under the influence of the works of North who insists on the role of institutions 
as a basis of property and the rights associated with contracts (Milgrom, North 
and Weingast, 1990), and on the other hand, they produce a totally a-historical 
analysis of the interaction among institutions and economic development. The 
result of this ambiguity is the production of performance measurement 
indicators from processing questionnaires based on content derived directly 
from the “law from the books”. By adopting this approach, LLSV are reviving a 
sort of legal formalism criticised by many authors in France (Raymond Saleilles 
and François Gény) and by the Realists in the United States. According to 
Saleilles, this traditional method of interpreting the law “consists in taking a 
code as a self-sufficient whole, which, without living an organised (in fact, far 
from it), is content to draw the logical consequences of its own underpinnings, 
so as to present, through a process of narrow deductions, a series of abstract 
constructions that come only from itself and include nothing from outside”. 
(Saleilles, 1899, p. V). Although these reservations are well known, they do not 
keep the supporters of the positivist conception of law from using that method. 
This first methodological bias is patently obvious in the topic “Closing a 
business” in the “Doing Business” survey, entirely constructed on the 
assumption that “reformed bankruptcy rules allow viable businesses to get 
through liquidity crises and quickly eliminate insolvent companies” (Doing 
Business 2006, p. 67). Here, the economy is used to argue in favour of this idea, 
without discussing it, whereas bankruptcy law also contains a significant a moral 
aspect and has, since the beginning, oscillated between a will to exclude and a 
need for rehabilitation (see Hautcoeur and Levratto, 2007, for a presentation of 
these two tendencies in French law in the 19
th
 century). Like the laws governing 
property rights to which it is closely related, bankruptcy law and its need to 
evolve into a system that enhances company business rests on a form of fictional 
economy (see Tartarin, 1982) in which growth is the consequence of flexible 
laws. The means used to foster dynamic entrepreneurship and encourage direct 
arrangements between debtors and creditors and thereby keep businesses in 
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operation – because a plant’s value is higher when it is operating - (see the 
OECD reports on this issue, particularly the Bologna charter) are defined with a 
high degree of precision, without any analysis or prior verification of alternative 
possibilities. It is as if the constructed indicators had to reinforce the conclusion 
reached from the outset, which consists in saying that preference should be 
given to out-of-court bankruptcy procedures. This is explicitly indicated by the 
preparatory work for the law of 1984 and 2005, which specifies that “one of the 
causes of the failure of current procedures is their complexity” and 
consequently, “it is advisable to simplify them by encouraging negotiation rather 
than court intervention” (National Assembly, 2005, p. 2), which nevertheless 
resulted in a conciliation procedure with approval by the commercial court. 
In answer to these remarks, which emphasise the deficiencies in an approach 
exclusively centred on formal law, one could retort that the questionnaires sent 
to bankruptcy practitioners originally came from databases created to measure 
the efficiency of the law. Hence, they are intended to evaluate practices and not 
written rules. This counterargument does not hold, however, because LLSV are 
not irreproachable even as regards the database content. 
The nature of the collected information is thus the source of the second 
identified bias and it must be examined to show that the limits of the World 
Bank indicators established through questionnaires filled out by national expert-
practitioners, usually legal firms including an American one operating in Paris, 
again for the “Closing a business” section. The data, gathered by consulting 
correspondents, does not aim to be exhaustive or even representative; at best, it 
conveys the feelings or impressions of professionals in the field – whose scope 
of action is never specified – in their particular area of work. Their perceptions 
are interesting in that they reflect the current climate and, in this domain, are 
justified by specialists such as Kaufman et al. (2003) who stress that “the 
subjective perceptions of governance are often as important as the legal reality” 
(Kaufmann et al., 2003, p. 20). This is especially the case with regard to the 
actual length of the proceedings, the estimate of which can only be made by a 
practitioner based on local experience, which gives no assurance of representing 
the overall situation. This method nevertheless reveals a significant amount of 
observational bias, a result the survey attempts to avoid by discussing facto 
situations that enable an assessment of “law in action” independently of the 
opinions of certain experts regarding the way the laws function. Recourse to 
experts in charge of informing the survey body concerning objective legal data 
that at best provide descriptions of positive law in force nevertheless does not 
prevent the use of databases developed with econometric tools from which the 
international rankings of bankruptcy law efficiency are drawn (see Davydenko 
and Franks, 2005 or Djankov et al., 2006).  
Thirdly, the World Bank method brings a certain degree of dissatisfaction 
because the selected indicators measure the procedural rules in force and not 
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how they are actually used in situations when companies find themselves in 
financial distress. For example, the duration of proceedings varies considerably 
according to the type of commencement of bankruptcy and the procedures 
adopted (see chart below). Immediate judicial liquidations take place within a 
period of 1.7 months after the case is brought to court, with half the immediate 
liquidations ordered in less than two weeks. Judicial liquidations following an 
observation period are ordered on average within 6.4 months and half of them 
last less than five months. Recovery packages take much longer to decide. In 
2005, the time between bringing the case before the court and the adoption of a 
plan was 8 months when it led to winding up the company and 12.4 months 
when it resulted in continuing operations. Nevertheless, many recovery 
packages require far more time: 10% of continuation plans took more than 19 
months to complete and 10% of sale plans necessitated more than 15 months. In 
the event that liquidation is ordered (immediately or after an observation 
period), the final closing decision takes place on average after three or four 
years. These time periods, which may be much longer, allow the liquidator to 
exercise the rights and actions relative to the debtor’s estate, to divide up the 
proceeds of sales among the creditors, and update the accounts (see Milan and 
Poutet, 2006). None of the variations in relation to a standard time for 
processing cases (as fictional as it is reductive) is mentioned in the work of the 
World Bank. 
Chart no. 2: Decisions of commercial courts regarding companies in financial 
distress 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Evolution 
2005/2004 
(in %) 
Judicial 
liquidations 
38,062 39,389 40,380 42,792 45146 +5.5 
Type of liquidation  
Immediate judicial 
liquidation 
28,204 29,441 30,355 32,192 33,971 +5.5 
Average time (in 
months) 
2.0 2.0 1.7 1.6 1.7  
Liquidation after an 
observation period 
9,858 9,948 10,025 10,600 11,175 +5.4 
Average time (in 
months) 
6.9 6.9 6.6 6.4 6.4  
Recovery packages 4,458 4,390 4,699 4,960 5,290 +6.7 
Type of recovery 
plan 
 
Continuation plan 3,573 3,424 3,676 4,024 4,448 +10.5 
Average time (in 13.3 12.8 12.4 12.1 12.4  
 11 
months) 
Sale plan 885 966 1 023 936 842 -10.0 
Average time (in 
months) 
7.9 7.6 8.0 8.0 8.0  
Decisions to close 
liquidations 
42,742 40,360 39,842 44,059 41,710 -5.3 
Reason for closing  
Insufficient assets 41,979 39,614 39,047 43,096 40,511 -6.0 
Average time (in 
months) 
42.8 43.0 45.0 44.8 45.1  
Termination of 
liabilities 
783 746 795 963 1,051 +9.1 
Average time (in 
months) 
52.1 57.6 59.4 60.3 61.3  
Source: SD SED – general civil repertory 
Between the abrupt character of the sole yardstick of length proposed by 
“Doing business” and the nuances contributed by the statistical data of the 
Ministry of Justice, it should once again be emphasised that the first approach 
does not help shed light on the actual workings of justice which requires an 
examination of bankruptcy files and practices in addition to the legal framework 
(an example of the application of this method to bankruptcies is proposed by 
Hautcoeur and Levratto, 2006). We can therefore reproach these indicators, 
constructed on the basis of a standard reference, for providing a literal reading of 
the rules and playing an active role in forming the types of legal systems that 
will result from their use. 
On may wonder then to what extent the three biases we have noted influence 
the assessment of bankruptcy laws and the recommendations regarding their 
evolution. Is there not a danger of overly determining the results? 
2.2. Fragile categories 
The information collected and processed by the World Bank, together with 
the macroeconomic databases and datasheets specific to bankruptcies, allow the 
upholders of Law and Economics to propose a twofold division in the modes of 
handling the legal proceedings resulting from cessation of payment. The first is 
part of a comparative perspective and applies at a given moment in time; it 
differentiates rules first of all according to the interests they protect and ends by 
identifying pro-creditor and pro-trade creditor rules (section 2.2.1.). The second 
division is orthogonal to the previous one; temporal and historical in nature, it 
finds the cause of the differences in the degree of bankruptcy legislation 
efficiency in the opposition between civil law and common law treatment 
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(section 2.2.2.). We are seeking to show here in what way these divisions are 
sensitive to the selected method and the analytic framework. 
2.2.1. A pro-debtor vs. pro-creditors division without demonstrated strength. 
In the literature devoted to bringing out an optimum form for handling 
cessation of payment, two main issues are debated: first, the balance sheet 
(assets or liabilities) that should be restructured and secondly, the consequences 
of breach of financial contract by the company director.  
- Restructuring the debt or the assets of a company in financial distress. 
In a context in which the stakeholders’ support for a company project, 
whether sound or not, is presented as a key factor in success, the main 
arguments in favour of renegotiating its debts concern the need to associate all 
the creditors in the decision-making process (Gertner and Scharfstein, 1991). 
This same argument prevailed in the reform of the law on insolvent companies 
as demonstrated by the presence of a friendly settlement procedure it introduced 
for bankruptcies in 1985, known as the Badinter law,
4
 which was confirmed by 
the law of 10 June 1994
5
 and reformed by the company protection law which 
came into force on 1 January 2006,
6
 which called for the intervention of a judge 
to keep certain creditors from anticipating renegotiation of the debt to dispense 
themselves from participating in it. This solution is widely preferred to the 
piecemeal disposal of assets, which is nevertheless favourable to creditors for 
the costs of liquidation are taken out of the revenue (Shleifer and Vishny, 1992). 
Yet, while the choice between these two avenues depends on the characteristics 
of the company and the investment decisions of its management,
7
 it is also 
influenced by the legal context, the second point debated by the authors. 
- The type of legal framework to adopt according to its repercussions on 
the various actors involved in the crisis (debtors, employees claimants, 
etc.).  
Taking into consideration the effects of the law on the behaviour of debtors 
and creditors leads to the question of which type of rules will best ensure debt 
restructuring for economically viable companies with temporary financial 
                                                 
4 This law introduced a negotiation process within the framework of a friendly settlement procedure between creditors and 
debtors. It yielded mediocre results due to the delayed activation of the provision, the opportunistic behaviour of some 
company directors aimed at obtaining sacrifices on the part of the creditors to increase their profits and the “clandestine 
passenger” attitude of some creditors who refused to reduce their demands, counting on company recovery authorised by 
payment deferments granted by others. 
5 This law, oriented towards continuing company activity, actually improved the situation of secured creditors, while seeking 
to encourage the start of a friendly settlement and increase the weight of creditors in negotiations. 
6 This law provides for three different procedures of friendly company management prior to actual cessation of payment: a 
specific mandate that does not require validation by a judge in which creditors take part voluntarily in possible waivers of 
debt, a conciliation procedure that allows confidential renegotiation of the debt with the creditors with approval of the 
agreement by a judge and a protection procedure that authorises the company head to ask to have its liabilities frozen in order 
to renegotiate the debt. 
7 In a case of financial distress, the manager may be tempted to reduce expenditures and investment or, on the contrary, to 
take more risks and over-invest. A strict bankruptcy law might pressure management to adopt the first approach, whereas a 
mild one should encourage taking more risks to try and save the business (see Eberhart and Senbet, 1993) 
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problems on one hand and the liquidation of inefficient companies on the other 
(see Blazy, 2000, p. 53 et. seq.). With a view to determining the characteristics 
of a law that would limit the behavioural deviation on the part of company 
management and the mistakes of judges, Aghion, Hart and Moore (1992) began 
to wonder about the beneficial effects of strict laws against managers who 
display imprudence or whose management is marked by incompetence. Their 
model reveals the disciplinary effect of systems in which company bankruptcy 
ends either in eviction of the company management or liquidation of the 
business, with the entire procedure under the supervision of a judge. In addition 
of its ex ante effect of encouraging prudence, this so-called pro-creditor rule (in 
the sense that it attributes to creditors rights over the management and capital of 
the company)
8
 should make it possible to avoid inefficient restructurings. The 
British system is traditionally held to be in keeping with this logic insofar as the 
administrative receivership procedure initiated by a creditor holding a floating 
charge
9
 then takes place under the supervision of a professional appointed by the 
initiator of the procedure with a view to being paid off (Pochet, 2001). The 
introduction of reforms in 1986, which was supposed to turn company rescue 
into “a genuine institution” (Armstrong and Cerfontaine, 2000, p. 563) did not 
alter the desire for vengeance and exclusion that characterises the Insolvency 
Act of 1986 (Ibid, p. 564). The same holds for the Canadian law governing 
companies in financial distress. 
These pro-creditors systems are not exempt, however, from harmful effects 
ranging from premature liquidation to liquidation of efficient companies, in 
cases grouped together by White (1994) under the name Type II error.
10
 Several 
works show that they could be avoided by introducing a greater degree of 
clemency into the formal procedures to encourage company management to 
behave in such a way as to optimise their investment plans and financing 
structures. This is the case of the Berkovitch, Israel and Zender model (1994), 
which shows that as the human capital specific to the business that is 
accumulated by the company manager determines the value of the company, it 
may be untimely and costly to replace the team in place if the poor results 
obtained are caused by the current economic situation. Similarly, the sanctions 
associated with a bankruptcy caused by what would be interpreted as excess 
investment might lead to excessive caution on the part of the manager, under-
investment harmful to company performance, and consequently to an increased 
                                                 
8 The model foresees the problems of company valuation raised by this procedure and solves them through the Bebchuk 
procedure (1988) which, by organising a system of attribution of property rights by successive, orderly share buyout by 
creditors guarantees a transfer of control under good conditions. Obviously, this manner of proceeding is quite difficult to put 
into practice. 
9 The term “floating charge” designates a special pledge of the whole estate of the debtor business. The value of the estate 
may change over time (e.g. the inventory) and the company may freely dispose of this property with the consent of the 
protected creditor until the moment when the claim “crystallises”. This” crystallisation” may take place, for example, when 
an administrative receiver is appointed, at the time of company liquidation, or in the cases provided for in the contract that 
created the claim. 
10 It is distinct from a Type 1 error which consists in reorganising the debt or the assets of an inefficient company. 
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risk of bankruptcy. Most of the authors (Bowers, 2000, Davydenko and Franks, 
2005, Pochet, 2001 and Recasens, 2003) consider that American law, marked by 
the determination to preserve the company, the most visible manifestation of 
which is the famous Chapter 11,
11
 is typical of a pro-debtor system. In France, 
the company rescue law adopted on 26 July 2005
12
 also seeks to protect the 
business, and through it, the debtor. The negative effects of these rules have 
often been underscored in the case of the United States, where air freight, energy 
and automotive industry companies in particular are put under the protection 
offered by Chapter 11 and thus escape from many creditors, including the bodies 
that dispense employee social protection and old age pensions. 
Several works attempt to bring out the superiority of one model over the other 
without succeeding in establishing a stable hierarchy between the various 
systems of prise en charge by the law de cessation of payment. The theoretical 
models (Alary and Gollier, 2004, Chopard and Langlais, 2006 and Recasens, 
2001) seek to identify the prerequisites for avoiding the occurrence of strategy 
failures on the part of company managers or of Type I and II errors. With a 
scope often reduced by the restrictive assumptions on which they are based and 
by the problems they encounter in trying to grasp the strategies of the various 
categories of actors involved, these models result at best in a typology of 
bankruptcy systems (Blazy et Chopard, 2006). The empirical research seeking to 
pinpoint the most efficient bankruptcy system has also been impeded by heavy 
reliance on assumptions and the sensitivity of the results to the selected criteria 
and the fragility of the established hierarchies (Davydenko and Franks, 2005, 
Djankov et al., 2006). The main conclusion of these studies is the usually poor 
performance of the various types of laws governing companies in financial 
distress. But this overall conclusion is nuanced by taking into consideration the 
type of country in which the rules are applied: “In the rich countries, the most 
efficient procedure is reorganisation. In the lower middle income countries, 
                                                 
11 Chapter 11 procedure may be compared to the French receivership system. In most cases, the company itself decides to file 
for bankruptcy. This procedure results in suspending any collection effort on the part of unpaid creditors (this is the 
Automatic Stay which corresponds in France to temporary suspension of individual proceedings). Failure to comply with the 
suspension of proceedings (e.g. lawsuits as well as letters and telephone calls to the debtor) may incur the payment of 
damages on the part of the creditor. The period of protection offered to the debtor is used to negotiate and draw up a 
restructuring plan that must be approved by the majority of creditors and the judge 
12 It provides for, in particular:  
- the substitution of the conciliation procedure for the friendly settlement procedure. In cases of financial distress, it will 
allow entrepreneurs to engage in friendly renegotiation of their debt with the main creditors as confidentially as possible 
without suspending the proceedings. The firm must give evidence of its legal, economic or financial problem, either actual or 
foreseeable, without being in a state of cessation of payment. The agreement may be approved by the commercial court. The 
company manager retains control of its management.  
- the creation of a rehabilitation procedure. This is a system of negotiation enabling the suspension of proceedings prior to 
cessation of payment. The aim is to arrive at a rescue plan negotiated with the creditors and approved by a qualified majority. 
This is a prevention procedure and not a recovery procedure. The company manager remains in charge of the company; he is 
merely assisted by an administrator for the negotiations. He may set up two committees: one bringing together banking 
institutions and other suppliers and the other, suppliers. The company manager presents them with a draft of the plan and 
must obtain a majority vote in favour of it (2/3 of the votes and 1/2 of voters). The court takes official note of the agreement.  
- a period of 45 days, instead of the former 15-day period, as of the cessation of payment, to request the commencement of a 
recovery or judicial liquidation procedure.  
- the recovery or judicial liquidation procedure may henceforth be commenced after the cessation of professional activity if it 
is the source of all or part of the debts.  
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attempts to rehabilitate the firm almost always fail, so the best procedure is 
foreclosure.” (Djankov et al, 2006, p. 5). It is also tempered by the study of the 
rights acquired by creditors (Franks and Sussman, 2005). In the end, the 
preceding authors unanimously acknowledge that the threat of eviction looming 
over management is far from the sole factor explaining efficient bankruptcy law; 
other factors also play an important role, such as how the business is authorised 
to continue its operations, and even more, the attraction exerted by the 
commencement of legal proceedings from the viewpoint of direct out-of-court 
renegotiation, and, another essential characteristic point of Law and Economics, 
the legal origin of the rules. 
2.2.2. Legal origins contradicted by the convergence and mixing of legal 
systems 
In the area of bankruptcy, the opposition between the flexibility of common 
law and the formalism of civil law leads to the conclusion the former is more 
efficient than the latter. The international comparisons carried out insist on the 
inefficiency of the French system which limits the rights of creditors and dilutes 
the value of collateral, including the sizeable personal collateral required by 
banks, without resulting in a satisfactory rate of recovery. The German and 
English legal systems, which give greater control and decision-making power to 
creditors while limiting formalism, guarantee higher recovery rates. However, 
these three countries demonstrate perceptibly equivalent performance when one 
observes private, out-of-court renegotiation procedures between debtors and 
creditors (Davydenko and Franks, 2005, p. 23-24). The factors that explain these 
variations usually concern the legal origin of the rules, which would explain the 
shareholder structure of the companies, the efficiency of the financial markets, 
the financial fragility of the systems, macroeconomic growth and the recovery 
rate of company liquidations (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, 2002) 
We will limit ourselves here to recalling the main characteristics attributed to 
the two types of systems. Civil law designates the set of fundamental rules of 
private law – the general principles of law, the rules concerning the status of 
persons and of the family, the system of property and the theory of obligations – 
which constitute the general law. It is often defined as a law originating in 
Roman law, but this definition reveals only part of its essence, for although most 
civil law countries include rules that can be traced back to their origins in 
Roman law, they usually also have rules that come from canon or customary 
law. Common law is more recent; it was gradually developed by the royal courts 
that sought to create a uniform law in opposite to local customs, based on a 
general – and fictional – custom applicable throughout the kingdom. The work 
of judges, it is therefore law that finds its source in court activity,
13
 which often 
                                                 
13 The rules drawn up by the courts do not necessarily constitute Common Law rules in the strict sense, because only the rules 
accepted and applied by the Royal Courts of Westminster establish Common Law. In the 15th century, however, the Court of 
Chancery enriched English law with rules of equity. Dual jurisdiction was abolished in England by the Judicature Acts of 
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leads to assimilating it with unwritten law, based on jurisprudence case law, as 
opposed to rules flowing from legislative sources. Nevertheless, its method and 
inductive reasoning which consists in generalising from precedents by observing 
the analogies between them are above all what distinguish common law from 
civil law, which, as more rational, is characterised by its deductive method and 
its will to generalise.  
Denounced in its principle, the opposition between bankruptcy law that is 
rigid because it comes from civil law and an adaptable law arising from its 
customary nature is no more relevant to making international comparisons in the 
area of debt renegotiation and company liquidation. The most relevant criticisms 
are expressed by Siems (2006) and Lele and Siems (2006) who deconstruct the 
groupings created by supporters of the Law and Finance approach and conclude 
that the character of the legal sub-sets they constitute is totally artificial. First, 
because only temporal arguments are used to justify considering two countries 
as coming under the same legal tradition (e.g. Austria and Switzerland are 
viewed together because their civil codes were constructed simultaneously). 
Secondly, because the identified legal families
14
 are based on a priori ideas and 
incomplete cultural constructs since they eliminate, among other things, any 
reference to an Islamic legal tradition. This decentring of the perspective leads 
to aggregating the countries of Eastern Europe, Asia and Africa, strongly 
marked by arbitrariness (see Siems, 2006, pp. 9 and 10 for examples of 
debatable groupings). The failure to take equally important factors into 
consideration regarding legal origins also weakens the typology and conclusions 
of LLSV. Among these criteria, we find the forms of colonisation and their 
impact on the laws in force in the colonies, the language in which the laws are 
written and the degree of independence of the magistrates which, when taken 
into account, results in forming other sub-sets accompanied by statistical tests 
that are as significant as those exhibited by LLSV(ibid, p. 22).  
The introduction of the historical dynamic undertaken by these authors opens 
the way to recognising the process of convergence of national legal systems, 
which, although strengthened by the development of international trade in the 
contemporary period, dates back to 18
th
 century. But it was in the 19
th
 century 
that the greatest awareness of the need for harmonisation of commercial law in 
general and bankruptcy law in particular developed. Locré (1827-1832) was 
especially clear on the subject during the debates on Book III of the Commercial 
Code and the will to harmonise it with other European legal systems, notably 
English law, among the legal experts who drafted it. Even if significant 
differences remain (Colfavru, 1863, p. vi and Santella, 2002) and the will to 
harmonise did not always result in a process of effective convergence, one will 
                                                                                                                                                        
1873-1875 when the new High Court of Justice was created. While all courts can apply both the rules of Common law and of 
equity, equitable remedies (e.g. the right of injunction) are still opposed to Common law remedies (e.g. the right to damages) 
today. In the event of a conflict, the rules of equity prevail. 
14 Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2005) distinguish the countries of English, German, Nordic and socialist legal origin. 
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note with Sgard (2005) that, in some respects, it is impossible to differentiate the 
various national laws. This legal mixing has taken different forms depending on 
the country and ranges from a fully bi-legal system as is the case of Canadian 
law on bankruptcy and insolvency
15
 to borrowing rules such as the introduction 
of a form of friendly agreement inspired by the American Chapter 11 in the 
French reform of collective procedures. This concern about harmonisation is 
especially strong at the European level where, despite the uncertainties 
generated by the recent bankruptcy procedure regulation of 20 May 2000 which 
came into force on 31 May 2002, one must acknowledge that the effort 
conveyed by this law to bring concepts and procedures closer together has 
already produced tangible effects.
16
  
All in all, whether the result is a mixing stemming from political will, the 
action of history or commercial necessity, the various national bankruptcy laws 
present significant similarities and, for that reason, cannot be classified solely on 
the basis of their origin. This weakens the typology and hierarchy established by 
LLSV. What can be substituted for this positive approach to law? 
3. Bankruptcy law, a capitalist institution: a reinterpretation of reforms of 
the law governing companies in financial distress 
A distinction is generally made between the handling of cessation of payment 
proposed by civil law inherited from the strict Commercial Code which seeks to 
exclude debtors from economic, political and even social life by keeping them in 
disgrace and the process authorised by customary law which is flexible and 
therefore favourable to an entrepreneurial spirit. In place of this distinction, we 
propose a division based on the nature of the assets at stake in the contract 
between debtors and creditors and the underlying vision of the firm. This change 
of viewpoint is legitimated by the transition that took place in the second half of 
the 19
th
 century between a moral, individual and social conception and a 
commercial, capitalist vision of bankruptcy. The optimum sharing of the debtor 
company’s assets and the inquisitorial procedure used to carry out this total 
dismemberment was substituted by a search for means to reinsert bankrupt 
company owners and the assets they managed into the life of the economy. 
These measures were first found in the practice of law, and were later given 
renewed codification with the law governing bankruptcy of 23 May 1838 aimed 
at encouraging the survival of efficient businesses, particularly through the 
introduction of a court-approved arrangement with creditors and above all, the 
law of 4 March 1889 which instituted judicial liquidation. Instead of a punitive 
                                                 
15 On this subject, one may consult the special 2003 issue of the Revue Juridique Thémis devoted to the harmonisation of 
bankruptcy law with Quebec civil law. 
16 To prevent the initiation of a different insolvency procedure in each Member State of the European Union where a 
company in a group is represented, the EU regulation of 29 May 2000 introduced a single procedure for recovery or judicial 
liquidation effective in all Member States. The legislation of the Member State in which the company has its main interests is 
to be applied, even if the company’s head office is not located in that country. The "Isa Daisytek" decree of the Versailles 
Court of Appeals, dated 4 September 2003, applied the provisions of this Regulation in France for the first time. 
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law resulting in dismembering the failing company’s assets, a moral and 
economic sanction was introduced, on which the smooth running of society as a 
whole depended, through successive reforms designed to substitute laws more 
favourable to the continuation of company activity. This appears quite early in 
the decisions of the commercial courts, notably that of the Seine department, 
which frequently ruled in favour of excusing the bankrupt trader and keeping 
him at the head of the company starting in the 1840s. These decisions reflected a 
desire to keep the company in the market rather than exclude it. Indeed, they can 
be interpreted as a means to correct earlier market failures such as granting 
excessive or untimely loans, which could be traced to rationing problems, 
planning mistakes arising from poor information or outside shock effects 
causing the insufficient liquidity or even insolvency of some companies. 
Two sets of elements coming under the scope of the law governing companies 
in financial distress and the change of status of the parties support the thesis of a 
bankruptcy law more concerned about the recovery of entrepreneurs than their 
exclusion from business life. The first is the establishment of a line of 
demarcation between situations of insufficient liquidity and those of insolvency 
(section 3.1.); the second is the arbitration between the respective rights and 
interests of the creditors and the debtors (section 3.2.). 
3.1. A law for traders applied by traders 
Systematically decried by legal experts, debtors, bankers and chambers of 
commerce, as attested by the criticisms levelled against Book III of the 
Commercial Code upon its promulgation, bankruptcy law, originally reserved 
for traders, nevertheless exercised such a strong attraction for other categories of 
the population that its scope was widened to include individuals. Beginning in 
the 19
th
 century, commercial law manuals insisted on the specification of the 
definition and identification of the rights and duties with which “those who 
exercise commercial acts and make them their usual profession” had to comply 
(Commercial Code, Book I; Title 1). Among them, we are particularly interested 
in the determination of who would benefit from trader status, and hence from 
bankruptcy law and the operation of the commercial courts where disputes 
between debtors and creditors were settled. 
3.1.1. Who is a trader? 
The term “trader” was introduced by the commercial code of 1807. Formerly, 
one spoke of merchants, wholesalers, bankers and artisans. At the end of the 
Ancien Régime, commercial courts had jurisdiction ratione personae to handle 
disputes between traders, but the law did not define this term and mere 
membership in a guild was not considered proof of status. The nobles, who were 
prohibited from engaging in commerce on pain of exclusion, skirted this rule by 
becoming sleeping partners, and some of them thus interfered in company 
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management without trader status.
17
 With the introduction of the Civil Code, the 
scope of trader status constantly expanded, conveying the will of participants in 
the business world to benefit from the treatment provided for by the Commercial 
Code, particularly as regards bankruptcy. The widening scope of the law led 
some authors (Marco, 1992 and Di Martino, 2005), by the way, to see this as the 
explanation for the steady rise in the number of bankruptcies during the 19
th
 
century. 
The question that arises is what led debtors to prefer the application of 
bankruptcy laws to bankruptcy offence (banqueroute). Was it due to the greater 
ability to begin new trading activity authorised by the former, which, ever since 
the “decodification” of 1838, showed itself increasingly favourable to the 
survival of companies and maintaining entrepreneurs in the economic world? 
This interpretation is supported by the introduction of the contract by waiver of 
assets introduced by the law of 17 July 1856, which released the bankrupt owner 
from administration of his estate, allowed him to return to commercial life after 
an arrangement with his creditors and halted his exposure to legal action by 
creditors. In contrast, the system of bankruptcy offence still favourable to traders 
would gradually become obsolete. Indeed, negligent bankruptcies could no 
longer benefit from liquidation and a fraudulent bankruptcies could no longer 
hope for an arrangement with creditors, or to be excused or rehabilitated (Guyot 
and Raffalovitch, 1901, “Faillite” article). With regard to non-trading cessations 
of payment, failure in no way protected the business: a collective procedure was 
not applied, especially as no organised party requested it whereas it would have 
been highly advantageous, and the fear of expropriating peasants led to 
removing them permanently from the scope of bankruptcy law. In the face of 
these disadvantages, a few courts sought to avoid them by creating the name of 
“civil receivership” for procedures that resembled bankruptcies (ibid, 
“Déconfiture” article).  
The advantages that traders obtained from a law made for them and applied 
by them explain in large part the abundance of case law relative to section 1 of 
article 437 devoted to the definition of trader status at the beginning of Book III 
“bankruptcies and bankruptcy offences”. Some 101 commentaries were noted by 
Dalloz and Vergé (1877, pp. 547-549); the same task of listing examples of the 
doctrine in this area was carried out by Tripier (1902, pp. 640-641), thus 
demonstrating the intensity of the debates over the interpretation of trader status 
and the possibility of acquiring it. The evolution of bankruptcy law observed in 
France testifies to the unification of commercial and civil law which admitted 
bankruptcy of corporations under non-trading private law (non-commercial 
partnerships, associations, trade unions, cooperatives), authorised receivership 
                                                 
17 In 18th century France, the Third Estate contested the immunity to personal bankruptcy enjoyed by the nobles and the 
clergy, which spared them imprisonment for debt. In 1789, traders and financiers demanded tighter rules, which was granted 
for a while by the Commercial Code of 1808, in a society that had become bourgeois and individualist, where the estates had 
been abolished (Hilaire, 1986). 
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for artisans in 1985 and for farmers in 1988 and allowed the liquidation of 
companies to be extended to their managers who were still did not have legal 
trader status. The same phenomenon of unification occurred in other countries in 
Europe, albeit at very different periods: in England, the Insolvency Act (1986) 
applied to all debtors, in Germany, the procedure ensuring equal rights to 
payment on execution among unsecured creditors (1877) was also applied to all 
insolvent debtors (which explains why this particular system was maintained in 
the three recovered departments of Alsace-Lorraine), as well as in the 
Netherlands (see Sgard, 2005). 
The bankruptcy system and the protection it offers were therefore valued by 
debtors who, owing to the compulsory "class", did not run the risk of finding 
themselves confronted by isolated creditors seeking to commence proceedings 
first, for fear of being overtaken by the others.  
3.1.2. Commercial judges with essential attributions 
Commercial courts, which are special courts within the judiciary system, are 
systematically criticised for their mode of operation. Since they were first 
instituted, their prerogatives in bankruptcy proceedings have nevertheless been 
confirmed. As the arbiters who determine the moment when a firm leaves the 
world of the commercial economy dominated by contracts and private property 
to enter that of litigation which organises the legal expropriation of the owners, 
judges are thus key components of bankruptcy as a capitalist institution. 
As bankruptcy is in no way a natural state, the question of defining the date 
on which the cessation of payment occurred arose very early for the courts and 
the authors of manuals and user guides for practitioners. In volume 1 of the 
“Dictionnaire des faillites”, Mascret listed the various conceptions of the state of 
cessation of payment and recalled the point of view of P-S. Boulier Paty 
expressed in the book “Des faillites et banqueroutes”, in which he maintained 
“it is less a question … of the trader being solvent or insolvent, than of knowing 
if, in fact, he pays or does not pay: whatever his assets, even if they are superior 
to his liabilities, if he stops paying, he is in a state of bankruptcy. On the 
contrary, if, through sustained credit, he constantly honours his commitments, 
even if he owes more than he possesses, he is not bankrupt” (Mascret, 1863, p. 
XXIII). The analytical commentary on the law of 8 June 1838 written by F. 
Lainné in 1839 seems to have dissociated the accounting situation of the 
business from bankruptcy, as the author considered that “…it is up to the judges 
to decide, in view of the circumstances, if the suspension of payments is 
equivalent to a real cessation …” (Lainné, 1839). 
Beyond the control they exercise over the methods of applying the law, 
commercial judges thus possess above all the power to discriminate between a 
temporary situation of insufficient liquidity and a situation of insolvency, the 
latter being a necessary but not sufficient preliminary condition for bankruptcy. 
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This provision appeared early on, for while the outdated legislation provided 
within a civil framework mainly for enforcement procedures that could vary 
according to local suzerainties, Title IX of the commercial order of 1673 
stipulated that “Bankruptcy or bankruptcy offences will be considered to 
commence on the day that the debtor withdraws or that the official seal is placed 
on his property” (Bravard-Veyrières, 1840, p. 617). This “…will of the royal 
legislator to bring legal clarity to the commencement of the procedure” 
(Desurvire, 1992, p. 39) enshrined the absence of any absolute criterion used to 
define bankruptcy and consequently, the importance of the judgement exercised 
by the courts. Commercial law manuals are clear on this point: the mission of 
the courts is to declare cessation of payment, they are also sovereign in their 
assessment of the circumstances and the facts related to cessation of payment, 
which leads them in particular to fix the date of cessation of payment (Colfavru, 
1863, p. 433). This provision is essential, for the date of commencement of 
bankruptcy makes it possible to fix the “suspect period”, i.e. the period 
preceding bankruptcy commencement during which the debtor may have 
executed more or less fraudulent legal instruments, for which the creditors may 
request termination. 
The key role played by the judges in the bankruptcy decision definitively 
distances this procedure from the image of a struggle of the weak (the debtors) 
against the strong (the creditors) with which the law of the market is often 
associated. Nevertheless, a breach of contract by the entrepreneur nevertheless 
does not put him out of play. On the contrary, he leaves one instituted system – 
the monetised market, regulated by the discipline of contracts and property 
rights – to enter into a judicial mechanism of governance and distribution of 
income. Like any transitional phase, this passage carries with it certain risks and 
the actors should be protected from them. Filing for bankruptcy, which the 
entrepreneur is asked to do to signify his honesty and spirit of cooperation
18
 to 
his creditors, flows from the same logic. This applies as well to the creditors 
who, from the start of the procedure, are prohibited from access to individual 
instruments for protecting their contractual rights which were available to them 
when the company was still in the market: seizure of assets, complaints to the 
prosecuting authority, etc. (see Jackson, 1986). The acknowledgement of the 
failure of the business owners and the organisation of the sharing of the assets 
under the control of the courts removes the multiple contractual ties binding the 
firm to the commercial framework and places it in the world of sharing debts 
among the various creditors, asset takeover by investors and a fresh start which, 
at the outcome of a procedure completely foreign to individualist, contractual 
logic, authorises its return to the market (on this topic, see also Ayotte, 2007). 
                                                 
18 Filing for bankruptcy marks the entry into the procedural order: the bankruptcy is made public and all management actions 
are subject to restrictions and close supervision – buying, paying, hiring, investing and repaying. From a formal standpoint, it 
is no longer the same agent. But the judges’ capacity to set the date of the beginning of cessation of payment also confers 
upon decisions prior to the formal commencement of the procedure an eminently suspect character: they can be cancelled 
retrospectively, by the way. 
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3.2. From protection of the rights of creditors to that of the business: a capitalist 
evolution 
Historically, the repayment of debt was considered a moral act and the 
inability to comply with this rule implied prohibition from any contractual 
activity as well as the suspension of all civic rights. By excluding bankrupt 
owners simultaneously from the market and civil society, the initial bankruptcy 
procedures merged the civic and economic dimensions of society. While the use 
of the rules in the 19
th
 century conveyed a preoccupation with reinsertion 
manifested by the trader-judges, the crises of the 20
th
 century were to give the 
rehabilitation of the bankrupt trader and the protection of the business a more 
systematic character. We are going to look at this dimension through two 
elements: first, the establishment of a hierarchy among creditors so as to 
eliminate the race to the courts (3.2.1) and secondly, the replacement of 
exclusion by protection (3.2.2). 
3.2.1. The redistribution of assets: between hierarchy and collective procedure 
Dividing up assets among creditors is the core redistributive challenge of 
bankruptcy. With the passage of time, successive reforms have constantly 
sought to attenuate the risk of a race to the courts fostered by the principle of 
“first come, first served”, in force for a long time, for example in German law. 
Whereas the judge takes official note of the failure of the business, the owner-
entrepreneur or the shareholders are formally and legally expropriated. This 
removal is required in liquidation and the accompanying disposal of assets. This 
is the stage in the procedure when conflicts emerge among the various 
categories of stakeholders, which have been given considerable attention in the 
literature on bankruptcy. Overall, the law provides that the payment of creditors 
shall be based on the price of the sale or the proceeds from the liquidation, with 
the income serving to repay creditors. Here a new level of bankruptcy 
organisation appears with a view to ordering the actual losses which until then 
were potential and now become real, and as a result, charged to the balance 
sheets of the various partners. The amount depends on the rank of the creditor’s 
claim in the order of repayment: legally or conventionally secured creditors 
(State, employees, secured suppliers) are repaid in priority according to the rank 
and extent of their privilege from the proceeds of the sale of the pledged 
property. In every case, their repayment takes place before that of creditors who 
relied on the debtor’s ability to pay (unsecured creditors), who are then paid in 
proportion to the amount of their verified, accepted claims out of the amount 
remaining after payment of the privileged creditors. These dividends are often 
low and in many cases unsecured creditors receive nothing. 
These differences of status and the resulting variations in payment explain 
why unsecured creditors, especially banks in the recent period, continually 
denounce the unfair treatment reserved for them. Hence, it seems timely to study 
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the internal conflicts within the class of creditors to understand the observable 
differences in the order of priority and the numerous reorganisations they have 
brought about since the procedure took on a collective character (Goré, 1969). 
By emphasising the existing tensions between the personal interests of the 
creditors and those of the masse to which they nevertheless belong, we can shed 
new light on the conflict between the need for swift liquidation of a business in 
cessation of payment and the attempts to protect the company and maintain its 
business which benefit not only ordinary creditors but also third parties either 
directly (employees, for example) or indirectly (local authorities, etc.). 
The recent modifications introduced in French law reveal the will of creditors 
to be given a priority rank that will allow them to anticipate a higher dividend 
than that granted to ordinary unsecured creditors. The order of payment 
instituted by article L.622-17-II of the Commercial Code establishes the 
following ranking among earlier and later claims:  
1. the super privilege of employees,  
2. the privilege of court fees prior to the decision to commence the collective 
procedure,  
3. the privilege of conciliation (see article L.611-11 of the Commercial Code),  
4. later claims eligible for preferential treatment,  
5. In the event of the sale of property subject to a special actual pledge 
(special privilege, pledge, mortgage) during the observation period or during the 
execution of a protection or rehabilitation, the holders of special pledges will be 
paid:  
- before later creditors not entitled to preferential treatment and earlier 
creditors, 
- but after later creditors entitled to preferential treatment.  
6. later claims not entitled to preferential treatment and later claims.  
The law of 26 July 2005 introduced a distinction among the later claims
19
 and 
provides that only those creditors whose claims are “useful” to the collective 
procedure shall benefit from favourable treatment. This modification 
corresponds to a new privilege in favour of later creditors, consisting of payment 
priority for later claimed defined in articles L.622-17-I and L.641-13-I, in the 
event of failure to pay these claims by the debtor. This is a privilege insofar as 
the benefit of payment priority is maintained, even if a second collective 
procedure is subsequently initiated, whether it is a procedure of receivership or 
of judicial liquidation. This means that the “useful” later claims of the first 
procedure will retain their payment priority over the earlier claims of the second. 
                                                 
19 Traditionally, later creditors known as “article 40 creditors” (art. L. 631-32 of the Commercial Code) benefited from 
favourable treatment insofar as their so-called “later” claim had to be paid at due date by the debtors, as opposed to so-called 
“earlier” claims that were frozen until the end of the observation period and then settled, if possible, either within the scope 
of a continuation plan or a sale plan. 
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They will, however, be ranked after the new “useful” later claims of the second 
collective procedure.  
This provision, which improved the rank of bank claims, was introduced to 
give creditors an incentive to take part in company receivership. Does this mean 
that, even if the outcome of the procedure is oriented to the market, a dividing 
line can be traced between the liquidated assets that will be put back into the 
market by the buyers who will attempt to enhance the value of the machines and 
technologies included in those assets, on the one hand, and the rescue of viable 
companies that will be able to face the commercial world after restructuring 
their assets and liabilities, on the other? 
3.2.2. Company protection or liquidation of assets? 
The fate of the company is one of the major concerns of the various actors 
involved in the bankruptcy process. The future of the firm’s productive assets – 
both tangible and increasingly intangible –is indeed important not only to the 
owner but also to bankruptcy judge, the court-appointed administrator and the 
creditors who, from the 19
th
 century onwards, have worried about the loss 
entailed by the cessation of business. Early on, reports by court-appointed 
administrators and the minutes of general assemblies of creditors expressed this 
fear linked to the loss of what would later be called “goodwill”, by pointing out 
the damaging effects of interrupting business on the amount of dividends paid to 
creditors. The latter, grouped together and assumed to play a key role in settling 
the bankruptcy through general assemblies, soon realised the antagonism that 
existed between their interests and those of the court-appointed administrator: 
- les creditors, like the entrepreneur to a certain extent, see their interests 
preserved by continuing the business which enables receipts to come in 
instead of having only disbursements to record, 
- the court-appointed administrator often finds it advantageous to keep the 
procedure going, for his remuneration depends on the number of steps 
carried out and because he may have connections with other entrepreneurs 
with an interest in taking part in the dismemberment of other companies to 
boost the growth of their own businesses. 
Here again, in the face of deviations from the doctrine revealed by an 
interpretive reading, we observe that very early on the commercial courts 
demonstrated imagination in getting beyond the lack of definitions of the basic 
concepts of bankruptcy to assess as best they could the complex situations 
experienced by companies in bankruptcy (Noël, 2003). Often deviating from the 
legislation condemning most bankrupt owners, victims of events beyond their 
control, the actors in the procedure (magistrates, agents, court-appointed 
administrators, creditors) seem to be largely free from the weight and rigidity of 
an essentially repressive procedure to adopt an economic attitude towards failing 
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companies authorised by their experience and familiarity with the local business 
network. While this practice would initially result in protection of creditors 
whose interests were affected by the complexity and length of the procedure as 
well as the loss of assets following the shutdown of business operations, it 
would also be concerned with the interests of the debtor. In this respect, 
although attenuated by the law of 28 May 1838, the extremely strict provisions 
introduced by legislators in 1807 were soon be skirted by the judges who often 
favoured continuing business activity. During the 19
th
 century, the latter would 
also mean almost systematically recognising the excusable character of the 
bankruptcy and a tendency to easily obtain the rehabilitation of the bankrupt 
owner, allowing the latter to begin commercial activity anew. 
The will of French legislators to promote the survival of companies in 
financial distress is visible above all in legislation in 1955, 1967, 1985, 1994 and 
2005.
20
 It also distinguished itself by granting essential authority to the courts 
and by the prevalence of the rights of debtors over those of creditors. The 
concern for continuing the business usually means deciding on a receivership 
procedure, which attributes to the judge the power to set, only in the cases where 
receivership is not manifestly impossible, an observation period which may last 
from six to twenty months, during which the management of the company is 
placed under direct or indirect court control. At the end of the observation 
period, the court may decide to liquidate the company or impose a receivership 
plan on the debtor and all the creditors. As the procedure almost always result in 
liquidation of the firm, the law of 2005 sought to strengthen the means 
implemented in favour of protection and to do whatever was necessary to give 
the prevention of company failures precedence over receivership. 
Here again, we see that the various legal systems for handling bankruptcy 
have resulted in a sort of convergence tending to favour keeping companies 
alive, as the value of a “going concern” is systematically assumed to be superior 
to the value of dismembered assets. In this case, it should be recognised that 
French bankruptcy law, represented today by the company protection law, 
authorised very early on an explicit distinction between the prevention of 
problems and their treatment.
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 The priority given to the survival of the business 
is therefore presented as a supplementary objective to the minimisation of 
transaction costs which consequently cannot constitute the sole criterion for 
                                                 
20 These trends were also perceptible abroad. Starting in the 19th century, bankruptcy law in the United States gradually 
detached itself from English legislation. Throughout the century, economic crises encouraged the adoption of laws favourable 
to debtors, which allowed the sale of residual property to creditors and sometimes recognised the right to be freed from 
unpaid debts without the consent of the creditors, which were repealed several years later under pressure from creditors. At 
the same time, the practice of friendly agreements between creditors and debtors became more widespread, even though it 
was impeded by the power of any creditor to denounce these agreements by requesting the commencement of bankruptcy 
proceedings. In Italy, the same demands were expressed by the Prodi law and several other extraordinary laws introduced 
between the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1980s to limit the social effects of industrial crises.  
21 The use of out-of-court modes of payment by companies in financial distress guaranteeing wide latitude for negotiation 
with stakeholders appeared as early as the Ancien Régime (Bertholet, 2004) and was quickly denounced due to the high costs 
it engendered (see Michel, 1900, p. 985 or Balzac, 1948, pp. 147-150). 
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assessing the efficiency of the law governing the end of operations. In any case, 
the legislators and court actors raised the question at an early date concerning 
returning the unused assets of companies involved in litigation to the market. 
Thus, they met capitalism’s need for self-regulation which, more than the 
simultaneous exclusion from the market and civil society in force in outdated 
law, requires setting up a system that authorises the cancellation of debts after 
liquidation of assets and decriminalisation. This dissociation of the economic 
order from that of civil society makes it possible to close the economic cycle by 
charging losses to balance sheets, returning part of creditors’ capital so they can 
reinvest it and giving the debtor a chance to engage in business once again. 
Conclusion 
As a symptomatic treatment of market failure, bankruptcy law is still subject 
to criticism, despite an increasingly pronounced will to protect businesses in 
every country, in the name of economic imperatives and efficiency. Forgetting 
the fact that “beyond its economic objective, aside from the repayment of 
creditors, the essential function of a law on collective procedures is to soothe 
minds and channel individualism” (Soinne, 1995, p.23), supporters of an 
approach gauged in terms of efficiency recommend introducing a system of 
managing bankruptcy solely for economic purposes. Conceived as an extension 
of company law and a necessary counterpart to contract law, LLSV maintains 
that the function of bankruptcy law should be reduced to setting up efficient 
means to ensure the redistribution of assets from an estate perspective. In our 
view, this form of pragmatism appears untenable at two levels:  
- First, at the empirical level which refers to our deconstruction of the 
indicators used in “Doing business” and of the categories on which they 
are based. The distributive imperative that underlies them and the 
minimisation of the time spent outside the market – a situation 
considered abnormal and useless by LLSV – can be explained by 
assimilating the company exclusively to an economic entity that should 
be sent bank into the market if it is viable or, if it is not, eliminated as 
soon as possible. In both cases, a profitable allocation of productive 
financial resources must result. This conception of protection in the 
name of particular economic interests has the defect of relegating the 
social questions and the conception of an enterprise as a mode of 
organisation bringing several groups of actors into play. It also leaves 
aside the debates raised by the question of the status and role of 
bankruptcy law in history and the status of a public concern acquired 
by bankruptcy over time. The laws and practices in force in the 19
th
 
century in France are especially revealing as regards this mutation of an 
outdated law mainly concerned with preserving morality and the 
interests of creditors – who also often held power in civil society – into 
a law that integrates the rights of the various parties and leaves the 
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possibility of handling all the economic consequences of insolvency 
and settling market failure in a non-market sphere. It was at then that 
the separation between the entrepreneur and the citizen or, more 
systematically, between the economic realm and the civil sphere 
became definitive, and bankruptcy law was to become an instrument 
acquired by politics to correct the harmful effects of an unfavourable 
economic environment. 
- Next, at the theoretical level, since we have replaced the search for 
economic efficiency of bankruptcy law by a conception of bankruptcy 
as a capitalist institution. Within the scope of this work, we have been 
able to show that bankruptcy does not correspond to any “natural” 
situation but rather that its occurrence depends exclusively on the 
existence of the laws that define and treat it. Thus, just as Weber 
considered that divorce does not exist without a law by the same name, 
we have suggested here that there cannot be bankruptcy – sanction of a 
trader’s failure to honour his commitments – if there is no legal system 
to qualify a situation of insolvency as bankruptcy. This conception has 
allowed us to develop the thesis of a bankruptcy law that would have 
neither a vocation to moralise society nor an exclusive mission to 
allocate assets efficiently. Beyond these two objectives, bankruptcy law 
would determine who makes up a company, the performance criteria to 
attain and consequently, the mode of governance of firms. In this 
regard, the question of the rights of stakeholders other than the 
creditors and the managers/owners, especially the employees, in the 
course of the procedure deserves to be explicitly raised, in addition to 
their right to be paid the wages they are due. 
In the end, the laws governing companies in financial distress must respond to 
more than the opposing interests of categories that are held to play essential 
roles because they make resources available (creditors) or enhance their value 
(debtors) or to an exclusively economic logic. It must respond to the question of 
how the legal institution can solve failures in the market. In our view, that is the 
meaning of the successive phases of the procedure: i) the insolvent trader is 
prohibited from exercising or placed under guardianship, ii) the creditors are 
brought together in a general assembly or joined together in such a way as to 
give a collective character to cessation of payment and replace individual 
arbitrations by a collective mode of resolution of the problem and iii) the owners 
and creditors are released from their previous commitments, which allows them 
to engage once again in a new activity. This three-stage sequencing enables a 
continuity between cessation of payment and the disengagement of the parties 
involved. Thus, far from being solely a selection method that purges the market 
of its failing agents, bankruptcy law opens up a space for resolving market 
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failures in a non-commercial way, which authorises the actors to return to the 
world of business by freeing them from their previous constraints. 
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